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the basis of the objection or the motion for a mistrial in the lower
court and were not urged to the Supreme Court on appeal.
Hugh T. Ward

LABOR LAW -

CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE ANTI-TRUST LAW AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Plaintiff, a union member, brought an action under the Ohio
anti-trust statute' to restrain a union and common carriers from
carrying out that part of a collective bargaining agreement
which prescribed minimum rentals for vehicles leased from
drivers. Plaintiff drove equipment which he owned and leased
to carriers on terms and conditions that differed substantially
from those of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff alleged that the fixing of prices at which the vehicles could be
leased violated the state anti-trust law by placing restrictions on
vehicles used in commerce. The defendant contended that the
contract provisions were to protect against leasing vehicles from
an owner-driver at a rental less than the actual cost of operation,
thereby making the driver apply part of his negotiated wage to
the operating expenses of the vehicle. The Ohio courts enjoined
the parties from giving effect to these minimum rental provisions on the basis that the regulation was price fixing, which
violated the Ohio anti-trust law.2 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The objective of the minimum rental provision was the protection of the negotiated wage
scale. The Ohio anti-trust law could not be applied to prevent
the contracting parties from carrying out their agreement on a
subject matter as to which the federal law directs them to bargain. Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 79 S. Ct. 297 (U.S. 1959).
The power to regulate interstate commerce is delegated to
the federal government by the Constitution, and under this
power Congress has regulated the field of labor-management relations. 4 Congress has not completely occupied the field, but has
1. OHIO RFV. CODE

§ 1331.01 (1953).

2. Appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a debatable
constitutional question. Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 167 Ohio St. 299, 147
N.E.2d 856 (1958).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4. Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1952); TaftHartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1952). See NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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left certain areas free for state action. 5 While the areas preempted by the National Labor Relations Act are not susceptible
of fixed metes and bounds 6 the following principles have been
established. A state may not prohibit the exercise of rights protected by the NLRA 7 nor enjoin unfair labor practices prohibited
under the federal statute,8 even if the NLRB has declined to assert jurisdiction.9 A state may regulate conduct which is neither
protected nor prohibited by the act. 10 A state may allow recovery
in tort against a union even though the union conduct may involve an unfair labor practice. 1 The courts have applied the
principle that a state may not prohibit the exercise of rights
which the federal act protects in various factual situations. It
is clear that a state may not interfere with the employee's rights
to bargain collectively, 12 and therefore a state could not enjoin a
union from operating in the state merely because of failure to
comply with a state statute requiring that the union and its
agents obtain a state license to operate.' 3 Likewise state laws
which prohibited the federally protected right to strike 14 and
which prohibited calling a strike unless authorized by a majority
of the employees in a state-conducted election were held invalid. 15
5. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
6. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
7. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956)
Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951) ; International
Union of Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) ; Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945). Cf. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
8. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). Cf. Weber v. AnheuserBusch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
9. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). For excellent
discussion of this case see Comment, 18 LOuIsIANA LAw REVIEW 149 (1957). Cf.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346
U.S. 485 (1953) ; La Crosse v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 18 (1949) ; Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
10. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) ; UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956) ; International Union, United Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Algoma Plywood
& Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) ; Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin
Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
11. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). Cf.
Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). For excellent discussions of the Gonzales and Russell cases, see Note, 19 LoUISIANA LAw REVIEW 200
(1958).
12. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
13. Ibid.
14. Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951). A state
law which made it a misdemeanor for*any group to engage in a strike which would
cause an interruption of an essential public service was held invalid.
15. International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1950).
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Finally, it is clear that a state may not enjoin the right to picket
peaceably.1 6
The above cases involved a conflict between state law and
federal rights concerned with methods of and freedom to engage
in collective bargaining. The instant case is the first to consider
a conflict between the terms of a federally sanctioned collective
bargaining agreement and a state law. The instant case presented two problems. One was whether the minimum rental provision
dealt with a subject matter within the scope of collective bargaining as defined by the federal law. Another was whether the
Ohio anti-trust law could be applied if it were found that the
subject matter was one which the federal statute included within
the scope of collective bargaining. The first problem was one of
interpretation of the agreement. The carriers and their employees were obliged under the federal act to bargain collectively
with regard to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. 17 The state court found that the minimum rental provision constituted a "remote and indirect approach to the subject
of wages, ' 18 and was therefore outside the range of the matters
on which the federal law required the parties to bargain. The
United States Supreme Court held that, considering the history
of the minimum rental provision, its objective was to protect the
negotiated wage scale. The union was seeking to protect against
the carriers' practice of leasing a vehicle from an owner-driver
at a rental less than the actual cost of operating, thereby making
the driver apply part of his negotiated wage to the operating expenses of the vehicle. 19 The minimum rental provision only ap16. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
17. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(d) (1952).
18. 79 S.Ct. 297, 301 (U.S. 1959), quoting from an unreported opinion of the
Court of Common Pleas, Summit County, Ohio. The record of the trial is not yet
available, but it was probably argued by counsel for the defendant that this contract did not unduly burden commerce. The state court could have found for the
defendant by finding that the restraint placed upon commerce by the agreement
was reasonable. If from all of the facts and circumstances involved, it is de-

termined that the restraint is reasonable, it will be upheld. See Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
19. Mr. Justice Whittaker dissented on the ground that while plaintiff was
driving his own tractor in the service of the carriers in performance of an independent contract he was an independent contractor, and not an employee. This
being so, he was expressly excluded from coverage by the National Labor Relations

Act.
The primary consideration in determining whether or not the statute applies
to a particular situation of employment is whether or not the declared policy
and purposes of the act comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed
by the act. The economic facts of the relation may make it more nearly one of
employment with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation,
and these characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification for purposes
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plied to the terms of the lease when the vehicle was driven by a
driver who was also the owner. As regards the second problem
presented the Court concluded that the Ohio law could not be
applied to prevent the parties from carrying out their agreement.
The federal law was supreme even though expressed in the details of a collective bargaining contract rather than in terms of
an enactment of Congress. Thus insofar as the terms of the collective bargaining agreement were within the contemplation of
the federal act, the agreement would supersede any conflicting
state law. In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on analogous cases which arose under the Railway Labor Act.20 The
latter act expressly provided that a "union shop" agreement between an interstate railroad and its employees could be entered
into, notwithstanding any state law. 21 In Railway Employes'

Dept. v. Hanson22 the United States Supreme Court held that an
agreement made pursuant to this express provision of the Railway Labor Act had the imprimatur of the federal law upon it
and by force of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution it could not be invalidated by any state law. In California v. Taylor,23 another case relied on by the Court, the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by a union and
a state-owned railroad under the Railway Labor Act conflicted
with provisions of the state civil service laws. It was held that
the state law could not be applied to prevent the parties from
carrying out the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
In the instant case the Court pointed out that it made no difference that the conflict was between federal labor law and state
anti-trust law. In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,24 the Court

said that it made no difference that the conflict was between
federal labor law and state restraint of trade law. Both types
seek to adjust relationships in the world of commerce.
The significance of the instant case is in its holding that the
terms of a federally sanctioned collective bargaining agreement
are controlling when in conflict with a state law. In order for
this principle to be applied in future cases it would no doubt be
necessary that the Court find, as it did in the instant case, that
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement are within the
unrelated to the statute's objective. See Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322
U.S. 111, 128 (1944).
20. 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
21. Ibid.
22. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
23. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
24. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
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contemplation of the federal act. The Court was careful to point
out that this was not a case in which a collective bargaining
agreement was in conflict with a local health or safety regulation. If such a conflict did exist between a local health or safety
regulation and the terms of a federally sanctioned collective bargaining agreement, which one would take precedence ?25 The Court
leaves this question unanswered. The real basis for the decision in the instant case seems to be that if any sort of limitation
is to be placed on the arrangements that unions and employers
may make pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act it is
for Congress to make and not the states.
Aubrey McCleary

NEGLIGENCE -

LIABILITY OF PROPRIETOR OF PLACE OF

AMUSEMENT FOR INJURY TO PATRONS CAUSED BY

ACTS OF THIRD PERSONS

Two recent decisions have dealt with the duty of proprietors
of places of public amusement to their patrons. In an Arizona
case plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained when she was
run over by an automobile while attending defendant's drive-in
theater. The seven-year-old plaintiff had been allowed by her
mother to sit on a blanket in front of their car to view the
movie. No signs warned patrons not to sit outside their cars and
no attendants of the defendant requested the plaintiff to return
to her car. The aisles were not lighted and a sign at the entrance
required patrons to drive with their lights out while in the theater. Upon a jury's finding that the defendant was negligent,
the Superior Court entered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The proprietor of a drive-in
theater is under a duty to protect patrons sitting outside their
cars against the danger of being run over by other automobiles,
where, because of the condition of the premises, such danger is
foreseeable. M.G.A. Theaters Inc. v. Montgomery, 83 Ariz. 339,
321 P.2d 1009 (1958). In a second case, plaintiff, a spectator at
a baseball game, sued the baseball club for personal injuries sustained when she was pushed from her chair and trampled upon
by spectators scrambling for a foul ball. The usher assigned to
25. The court has said, however, that the "intention of Congress to exclude
States from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested." Allen-Bradley
Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).

